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1SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON CHINA'S MINORITIES IN
THE 21st CENTURY: CONFLICT OR CONCILIATION?
Thomas Heberer
Introduction
There has been a significant increase of ethnic conflicts in the last decade. They
constitute one of the main sources of domestic political instability in multi-
national countries. Political, economic, cultural, religious and history related
conflicts as well as the worldwide ethnic revival re the main causes. China has
not been exempt from this trend, as demonstrated by ethnic conflict in Tibet,
Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. This can be attributed to internal causes
(liberalization, reform policies, the policy of "opening" to the outside world,
social change), to the influence of the disintegration of multi-ethnic states like the
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia or to increasing ethnic nationalism in
neighbouring Central Asia. Therefore, in China new mechanisms of conflict
solution will have to be found as well.
The political campaigns of the Mao era led to deformations of ethnic cultures.
Alienation from cultural values changed the character of minorities, and many
minority intellectuals were alienated from their own culture and their cultural
roots. But the attempt at forced assimilation, particularly during the "Cultural
Revolution" (1966-76) promoted the consciousness of ethnic identity. The liberal
policies of the reform era have given great latitude to this ethnicity.1 Social
change following upon economic change, political liberalization, and the erosion
of socialist ideology led to a new search for identity among the ethnic minorities,
particularly because the process of modernization is in many ways felt as a
menace to ethnic identity, ethnic cohesion and mode of life. Amidst rapid social
change people turn back to their ethnic culture, seeking protection and security,
and this becomes a substantial motive for ethnonationalism and growing
ethnicity.2
Rising ethnicity, on the one hand, has a protective function for an ethnic group; on
the other hand, it is a sympton of a crisis.3 As Na h puts it:
"The identity dimension of ethnicity (...) rests on the fact that fellow
members of the ethnic group are thought to be 'human' and
trustworthy in ways that outsiders are not. The ethnic group provides a
refuge against a hostile, uncaring world. Like a family, it has
continuing claim on loyality and sacrifice .... The idea of refuge, the
place where one is fully human, whatever failure or success happens
in the larger world, is the cement and power of ethnic membership and
continuity."4
                                                 
1 Smith 1996, pp. 445-458.
2 Rösel 1995, pp. 117-130.
3 Reiter 1991, p. 69.
4 Nash 1989, p. 128.
2It is exactly this element that prevents assimilation of ethnic groups in China in
the name of "socialism" or "socialist modernization". This psychological force of
ethnicity thus reaches beyond the idea of national consciousness and attempts to
explain psychologically why people cling to a political identity. This explains to
us why all attempts at forced or covert assimilation (not only) in China are
unavailing, and why every political liberalization leads to a stronger self-
consciousness of nationality.
The growing influence of religion and traditional culture among ethnic minorities
in China must be understood as another indication of rising ethnicity.5 In this
context, religion and traditions are not only a reminder of one's own culture and
cultural identity, but are also a reaction to the process of social change directed
from above by Han Chinese (the ethnic majority in China). The process of
modernization and change threatens the cohesion of an ethnic group and thus
often provokes mobilization for preserving the group identity. At the same time
this process creates new ethnic ideologies and institutions.6
Ethnic identity we understand as a group's consciousness of its ethnic, historical
and cultural peculiarity and 'otherness'. Here we must pay particular attention to
cultural identity as part of ethnic identity.7 We think of culture as not only a kind
of materially manifested system of habits and customs, but also as psychic
income, "those things which satisfy the mental and spiritual needs of human
beings".8 If culture, as a value system common to the members of a given society,
becomes a means by which they define their identity and simultaneously mark
themselves off from others, this explains why culture and nationality are very
tightly interwoven, and why attacks on culture are concurrently understood as
attacks on the identity of a nationality.
Social scientists once held the opinion that with economic development and
modernization religious, ethnic and cultural differences between societies would
disappear; ethnic de-differentiation would be the result of modernization
processes.9 It was widely assumed that market expansion, industrialization and
modernization would lead to ethnic homogenisation of cultures. But in fact the
opposite was the case: ethnic revival as well as social and cultural differentiation.
This is true also for China, but till now there have been very few detailed studies
on this subject.10
China consists of 56 nationalities. The majority with more than 1.2 billion people
call themselves "Han", although the Han are not a homogeneous nationality, but
include different groups, a point I will not address here. The population census of
1990, the last one, revealed 91.2 million people belonging to one of the 55
"national minorities", 8% of the entire population. According to the micro census
of 1995, only five years later, China had about 108.5 million people belonging to
such a minority, about 9% of the total population.11 Since the 60s, the minorities'
population has developed more rapidly than that of the Han.
                                                 
5 Haynes 1994, pp. 150ff.
6 Newman 1991, p. 452.
7 DeVos/Romanucci-Ross 1995, pp. 349ff.; DeVos 1995, pp. 15ff.
8 Kellas 1991, pp. 66-67.
9 Banton 1967, p. 2; Esser 1980, pp. 118f.; Heckmann 1992, pp. 30ff.
10 Dru Gladney's study on the Hui (1991) is one of the rare case studies.
11 Cf. Gongren Ribao, 15 February 1996.
3Han - Minorities Population Share According to Population 
Census (in %)
Han  93,9     94,2     93,3     92,0     91,0    
Minorities  6,1     5,8     6,7     8,0     9,0    
1953 1964 1982 1990 1995 
Surprisingly, the population of some nationalities multiplied between the
population census of 1982 and that of 1990. For example, the number of the
Russians has increased from about  3,000 to 13,000, that of the Gelao from 54,000
to 438,000. The numbers of Manchus, Xibe, Qiang, She und Tujia has doubled.12
There are several reasons for that: higher birth rates, changes of ethnic
registrations, because people identify with a minority due to a stronger feeling of
ethnic identity or material advantages. In principal, less the natural increase of
populations, but rather rising ethnicity and ethnic identity are the principal reasons
for this development.
In contrast to the former Soviet Union two points are important:
· Unlike the former Soviet Union, China is not facing disintegration
· Today we do not have some kind of ethnocide inside China
Furthermore, we should appreciate affirmative policies toward non-Han
nationalities: like the recognition of the existence of different ethnic groups, the
prohibiting of discrimination, special laws for minorities in the 1950s and in the
80s; providing aid to minority areas, guarantees of special representation in
political institutions, special benefits in terms of population policy and university
entrance examinations, freedom to choose ethnic identity etc.13 But when
discussing the future of minorities, it is not sufficient to mention positive aspects
                                                 
12 Zhongguo minzu tongji nianjian 1997, pp. 299/300.
13 Cf. Sautmann 1998. Affirmative action see Pincus 1994; Blumenwitz 1995, pp. 151ff. Many
Han-Chinese perceive these policies as a discrimination against the ethnic majority.
4only, but features which explain existing conflicts that affect stability should be
addressed, and possible methods of conflict reduction should be considered.14
1. Patterns and Sources of Conflict
For many years China officially denied the existence of ethnic conflicts. But
recent opinion polls among Chinese citizens point to growing ethnic conflicts. For
instance: A survey (about 80% of the people asked belonged to minority groups)
revealed that
(1) 51.7% of the people asked did not believe that the relationships between Han
and minorities were harmonious and unrest in minority areas would not
occur.
(2) The growing disparities between Han-areas and minority areas were assessed
as follows:
· increases feelings of inequality among minorities (63.3%);
· will stir up ethnic unrest (35.6%);
· increases feelings of discontent (33.0%).
(3) Only 30.3% were of the opinion that political equality between Han and non-
Han have been realized.
(4) Merely 9.7% were satisfied with the existing autonomy.15
Another survey (in which 135 people of 24 nationalities were questioned) asking
for trends in the next decade revealed:
Answers                                                    %
No unrest will occur 32.6
Unrest and turmoil will happen 23.7
No answer                                                43.7
Source: Yang Jingchu 1996: 18.
Less then one third were of the opinion that no unrest will occur. More than two
thirds were not so clear about this or expressed the opposite opinion. The findings
of the two surveys demonstrate that a rather large percentage of people expect
growing ethnic conflicts in the near future.
In my opinion there are primarily five sources of conflict: collective memory,
political conflicts, economic conflicts, cultural conflicts and new conflicts arising
from economic and social change.
                                                 
14   An enlarged German version of this article: Heberer 2000b.
15 Weng/Zhang/Qu et al. 1995, pp. 202-219; Jiang/Lu/Dan et al. 1996, pp. 212-219.
5In the following, I will explain the above mentioned five strings of conflict.
1.1 The first source of conflict: collective memory and historical knowledge
"Nations begin in the minds of men" argues Ross Stagner16, indicating that
conflicts have their origin in the mind of nationalities. Stereotypes and prejudices
towards the others shape the behavior towards them. This implies a historical
dimension. Therefore, an analysis of ethnic conflicts has to start with an analysis
of the historical and mental-cognitive dimension, with the ideological resources of
conflicts17, in order to understand what creates ethnic conflict and resistance.
The dimension of collective memory and historical knowledge encompasses two
points:
(a) historical conflicts and traumatic events in the memory of an ethnic group
(like suppression or expulsion, something that has happened rather frequently in
Chinese history, e.g. the bloody suppression of the Miao and Hui uprisings in the
18th and 19th century or of the uprisings of the Yi, Tibetan, Yao and others in the
50s or 60s), and especially traumatic events during the Cultural Revolution;
(b) perceptions of non-Han people by the Han in history
1.1.1 Sino-centred images
Even today, traditional perceptions shape the behaviour patterns and attitudes
towards other people (minorities) and the expectations how those minorities
should behave towards the power center. This has to do with more than two
thousand years of continuous predominance of central power and Chinese culture.
Imperial China understood itself as the cultural center of the world and its culture
as the culture of mankind per se. In traditional concepts of belief the existence of
various peoples with clear-cut settlement areas was accepted; but there was only
one people entrusted by heaven to be in charge of the whole of mankind. This
people was thought of as the center of the world, as the "Middle Kingdom"
(Zhongguo) and its emperors as "Sons of Heaven".
This sino-centered image was combined with Confucian perceptions of social
hierarchy: Ideas of equity didn't exist, because things weren't equal. Take for
example two persons, one was always older, higher ranking or of another sex.
Those conceptions were applied to external relations as well, with the Chinese
empire at the top of the hierarchy. The rest of the world consisted of immediate
border areas which were directly subordinated to the empire, like Vietnam, Korea
or Japan, the "inner barbarians" at the periphery of the empire and the "outer
barbarians" outside that realm.
The people who represented the ancient river culture (later called Han) classified
the people surrounding them as "barbarians". This classification was done
according to directions (north, south, east, west barbarians), from the distance of
                                                 
16 Stagner 1967, p. VII.
17 On ideological resources see Imhof 1993, p. 333.
6that people from the center of the world (the court of the emperor) as well as
according to their behaviour towards this center. The emperor's court expected
regular tributes, the rulers and leaders of other people were regarded as tributary
vassals. Relationships existed mainly with people assessed as weak and culturally
inferior. Under conditions of far-reaching isolation for many centuries the idea of
superiority was always confirmed. The Han, who were farmers, were
contemptuous of the peoples around them, who were hunters and gatherers or
nomads and whom the Han believed to be culturally and technologically inferior.
Confucianism, for centuries the state-bearing ideology, was the ideological
fundament of the contempt of the "barbarians". They were contempted, because,
as the great Chinese historian Sima Qian (ca. 145-86 B.C.) stated, they knew
nothing "of li, the proper [Confucian] rules of life and yi, the duties of life".18 To
be different was by the old Chinese understood as an expression of ignorance of
the social structure of relations and of the Confucian rites. They concluded that
"barbarians" were unable to control their "emotions", tended rather to give way to
their feelings and would behave "like birds and wild animals".19
Nevertheless Confucianism did not intend to annihilate these people, but
demanded their subordination to the emperor as well as their integration into the
Chinese empire. The aim was "cultivation" by Confucian values, i. e. a cultural,
non-violent assimilation. Even a "barbarian" could become an emperor, but only
by fitting into the Chinese system and by giving up his previous identity.20 Even
today this attitude has changed only gradually and remained an important
component of Chinese nationalities policies.
In fact, this traditional world image has been disintegrating since the middle of the
19th century, last but not least through Western influence and penetration, but its
basic ideas have by no means disappeared.
Not only the traditional assessment of the non-Han people by the imperial court
belongs to the historical facts, but also the historical experiences which those
people have had with the Han. All these experiences, which find expression in the
collective consciousness of a nationality, are underestimated. In official
descriptions the history of the non-Han people is mainly reduced to three points:
(1) to an early and close connection or affiliation to China;
(2) to the struggle of the exploited and suppressed against the rulers of one's own
nationality;
(3) to the struggle against imperialism and against those who want to split up the
unity of the motherland.
Till today the evaluation of minorities depends on their service to the (Han-)
Chinese nation.21
                                                 
18   de Groot 1921, p. 3.
19   Cf. Wiens 1954, p. 219; Müller 1980.
20 Franke 1962, p. 22.
21   See for example Bulag 2000, p. 196.
7However, in Chinese history another point exists as well, that is the expulsion of
these people to remote areas and cruel punishments in case of revolt. The history
of the Miao or the Hui and their treatment by the imperial court serve as evident
examples. These aspects of history are rarely or never mentioned in Chinese
history books. And this one-sided perception of history is the very reason why
traumatic events (like expulsion and cruel punishment) are not critically re-
assessed, but reproduce themselves in the collective consciousness of an ethnic
group and thus perpetuate contradictions between nationalities. Traumatic events
did not only occur during the time of imperial China or in the Republic of China,
but also during the People's Republic. The various political movements
(movement against local nationalism in the second half of the 50s, the Great Leap
Forward at the end of the 50s or the Cultural Revolution 1967-76) represented the
worst excesses of suppression of nationalities which cannot simply be blotted out
from the memory of an ethnic group. It is true that the Cultural Revolution has
influenced every inhabitant of China, but there is one important difference: these
movements were perceived by the Han as movements for which their own
political leadership was responsible, but by non-Han as movements for which the
Han and their party were responsible. In the first case it is considered as a political
conflict, in the second case as an ethnic one. The trauma of those years, when all
ethnic and religious differences were regarded as hostile and reactionary, has not
simply disappeared.
In the beginning of the 80s a cadre of the Yi expressed this different attitude
between Han and non-Han rather clearly:
"In the 50es the Party told us, Gao Gang and Rao Shushi [two leading
Party figures in northeast China that were purged in 1954] were bad
guys and should be criticised; in the 60es Liu Shaoqi [the former head
of state; he died in prison during the Cultural Revolution] had to be
criticized. Lin Biao, the deputy of Mao [during the Cultural
Revolution] was at first magnificent, then an evildoer (hua an). We
had even to criticize Confucius. All those people were Han, and we
don't know, if they were good or bad. We have nothing to do with
them."
The Cultural Revolution was not only directed at psychological and physical
annihilation and suppression, but comprised the element of memoricide, that is the
extermination of historical documents, accompanied by rituals of intimidation, in
order to demonstrate who has the monopoly of interpretation of Chinese history.
This memoricide has not been forgotten, especially today, where representatives
of various minorities are trying to reappraise and reinterpret their history.
Concurrently, among ethnic minorities in China we find a rediscovering and an
increasing consciousness of history. Accordingly, Stevan Harrell argued that in
China a triple pattern of ethnic classification is existing: ethnohistory, a scholarly
discourse of the history of a nationality or an area; state discourse of ethnic
historization, the official classification by Chinese authorities, and e hnic identity,
the perception of one's own and ethnic identity.22 Undoubtly, there exist
differences in the way in which different nationalities evaluate history and
                                                 
22 Harrell 1995, p. 98.
8historical events, a fact that till today is not sufficiently understood by the political
leadership of the Han.
But, beside the sinocentric world view we have another element of perceiving
non-Chinese "barbarians" in China: the idealization of their naturalness and
simplicity, a factor mentioned above that I will not address here.
1.1.2 Minorities and Exotism
"Exotism", writes the French anthropologist Michel Leiris, is
"the distortion of the stranger and unknown as the brave 'savage' or
'good guy from the jungle' or generally his degradation to an object of
projection. The exotic motivated encounter is not based on the interest
to learn something about the other in his order or about oneself.
Exotism is ethnocentric decorating and adventurement."23
And it is exactly this exotism which seems to characterize the official image of
"minorities" in the Chinese public. Mostly they are depicted dancing, singing,
laughing, in colourful garments, under palm trees, in high mountain areas or
bizarre landscapes. The dances are wild, fires are blazing, mythical images are
shown, so that the spectator feels strangeness and sometimes suspicion and fright.
Mainly young women are depicted whose features, figures and motions are
similar to Han ideals of beauty. This can even include an eroticisation of
minorities.24
1.1.3 Patriarchal Myth of Kinship
A patriarchal kinship myth characterizes the official description of the relationship
between Han and minorities. Han are described as father-figures or elder brothers.
Surrounded by members of minorities they advise, teach and instruct them, they
are teachers and idols. This  is expressed by the name "big elder brother" (lao da
ge), the name Han have given themselves in terms of minorities.
Well, fathers or elder brothers have the task of educating the children or the
younger brothers and sisters - a clearly Confucian element, which of course can be
found in other world regions as well. This patriarchal concept finds its ideological
expression in the idea that the most advanced culture is that of the "father ethnic
group", i. e. the Han. Society as a whole is regarded as a homogeneous ethnic
community, a closed unit like a family, where only a division of labour between
the superior and the inferior exists. The head of the family (the Han) has the duty
to protect the family, to educate, instruct and advise its members, the children
(minorities) are expected to be loyal and to respect the father of this family and
his education concepts.
                                                 
23   Leiris 1979, pp. 40/41.
24   Cf. Heberer 1997a.
91.1.4 Historical Backwardness and Hierarchization
The traditional perceptions correspond well with historic-materialistic concepts
developed, for example, by Josef Stalin in the 30s. According to his "doctrine of
socio-economic formations" the societies of all nationalities in history could be
classified in five categories: primitive, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist
societies.25 This concept, which has its origin in the European history of ideas
(e.g. Turgot), fitted well into the traditional Chinese thinking of hierarchization. In
this way every ethnic group had their fixed place in the hierarchy of nationalities
and in its relationship with the "most advanced" people, the Han. Under socialism
the Han could retain their traditional position and function toward non-Han
people: As the societies of the national minorities were considered inferior to that
of the Han, the culture of the Han remained the highest-ranking one. It was the
duty of the Han to civilize and modernize the minorities' societies. The cultural
"avantgarde", representative and guardian of culture and civilization, was now no
longer the emperor's court, his officials, the gentry and the traditional examination
system, but the Communist Party with its functionaries and its education system.
The duty of every nationality was to catch up with the Han as quick as possible
and to bring its economy and society into line with that of the Han. The
patriarchal state correspondingly had to initiate suitable measures and policies. It
decided what was useful for a minority, what was advanced or backward, civilized
or uncivilized, and which customs or habits were beneficial or harmful and had
accordingly to be abolished or reformed. Even today school students learn that
ethnic minorities were economically and culturally more backward than the
Han.26
Stereotypes like those mentioned above are an obstacle to earnest discourse and
debate between the Han and the non-Han people and their cultures. The de-
mystification of the strange and unknown, of the "other", the understanding of
exotistic prejudices and stereotypes remains an important task. The decisive
aspect of such stereotypes is the concept of hierarchization, because it perpetuates
and legitimizes inequality and tutelage. The philosopher Michael Walzer has
pointed out that the idea of a cultural hierarchy always poses a threat for the
people whose culture is devaluated. Hierarchies, so Walzer, are never "innocent",
because they tend towards policies of discrimination.27 The classification as
inferior is thus an obstacle to true autonomy or self-administration, because those
nationalities are seen as incapable of successful management and self-
government.
To summarize this point, the Chinese nationalities project is characterized by the
following distinctive mental concepts:
(a) The concept of China as a territorial project (Zhongguo, the Middle
Kingdom), i.e. the idea of a territory that is not populated by nationalities per
se, but by a territorially defined community constituting a large family
(guojia, as a general term for state and country, a combination of the
characters for state/country and family). All people living upon this territory
                                                 
25 A  more recent example of this classification: Yang Houdi 1997, pp. 1ff.
26   See Hansen 1999.
27 Walzer 1996, p. 186.
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are considered as "Chinese" (Zhongguoren). In this concept the Han are
perceived to be a cultural model and political pace-maker.28
(b) The notion of the homogeneousness of a dominating culture ("Han") in
contrast to quantitatively und qualitatively inferior "ethnic minorities"
(shaoshu minzu). Indeed, this dichotomy was constructed only. Actually, the
Han do not constitute an ethnically homogeneous group either. Rather, they
are the result of a mixture of various people during history; furthermore, they
comprise groups that differ significantly in terms of language, dress, customs,
habits or ways of living. Some groups even do not perceive themselves as
"Han" (e.g. the Hakka or the Taiwanese).29 As far as the minorities are
concerned they do not constitute an uniform entity, too, but comprise a wide
range of different groups. Considering the relationship between Han and non-
Han the American social anthropologist Charles McKhann argues, that
ethnicity in China is not only related to a "bipolar structure, in which all (55)
minorities are opposed to the majority Han", but also an interdependent
process of relations between neighboring minority groups.30
(c) The perceiption of history as a gradual development and learning
process, in which the Han have the "historical task" to "cultivate" the
"minorities" as well as the perceiption of the existence of an ethnic hierarchy
with the Han as the most developed nationality on the top. Stevan Harrell has
called this the civilizing project.31 And this is exactly the fundament of what
in China is labelled "nationalities relations" (m nzu guanxi), a concept that last
but not least could be classified as an expropriation of the history of the ethnic
minorities.32
But to reduce the perceiption of minorities by the Han just to those three concepts
would be one-sided. Furthermore, there are other perceiptions as well, e.g. an
idealization encompassing images of exotism, originality and pureness. Depicting
European images of Asia the German sociologist Volker Heins once distinguished
three "moral world maps" in perceiving the "East".33 If we adopt this concept to
the Han perceiption of ethnic minorities we will find the same set of maps in the
minds of Han: (1) the barbarian minorities of stagnation and backwardness; (2)
the sinicized minorities as late-comers of development that have to catch up with
the Han as quick as possible and to bring their economies and societies into line
with that of the Han, and (c) the delightful minorities of prodigy, exotism and
esotericism.34
1.2 Political Sources of Conflict
This encompasses two points:
                                                 
28 Dikötter 1992, p. 97 notes that the Chinese concept of mi zu (nationality) is a synthesis of the
terms lineage with a common territory and common ancestors.
29 The Han consist of at leas ight distinctive language groups.
30 McKhann 1998, pp. 1ff.
31 Harrell 1995b, pp. 3ff.
32 The ethnic hierarchy is accompanied by language hierarchy, cf. Dwyer 1998, pp. 71ff.
33 Frankfurter Rundschau, 28 December, 1996.
34 Cf. Heberer 1997a.
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· Lack of real autonomy
· Contradiction between a multi-ethnic country and a party where ethnicity counts
for little
The Cultural Revolution made it clear that the integration of non-Han people was
to be achieved not through force, but through measures that were based on a broad
consensus. The 1982 constitution re-evaluated the minorities correspondingly, and
the 1984 "Autonomy Law" formally extended to them the widest-reaching
freedoms since the founding of the People's Republic.35 But most of the clauses of
the Autonomy Law were so vaguely worded that they are unimplementable in the
absence of accompanying laws. It is a soft law, that is it sets goals that should be
followed as much as possible by state policies. It lacks reference to an effective
system for the protection of autonomy. In addition, there are no legal measures for
the implementation of this law. There are correspondingly many complaints that
local authorities do not keep to it.36
Because those rights are not really enforceable (in the end, there is no law
independent of the Party and no constitutional or administrative court), the degree
to which rights can be realized depends on the current party line, and is therefore
quite arbitrary. As early as 1980 a representative of the Li on Hainan had
complained bitterly about this indeterminacy of rights. There were laws even in
the fifties, but in 1958 these were criticized and the Li and Miao Autonomous
Prefecture was dissolved. In 1962 it was restored. In 1966 it was explained again
that autonomous areas were no longer needed, and those dissolved were later once
again restored. And "Today a party secretary comes and abolishes the autonomous
region, tomorrow the next one comes and establishes it again. In many ways the
autonomous regions and their development depend on this or that line."37 Tha  this
development continues is demonstrated by the fact that this autonomous
prefecture was again dissolved in 1988. The relatively large autonomous
prefecture stood in the way of the process of opening up the island of Hainan,
elevated to the status of a province, and was therefore abolished without much
comment.
The lack of implementable rights of self-rule, together with the creeping
undermining through Han migration into minority areas and environmental
damage in those areas, things over which nationalities who are practising
autonomy have no kind of influence, are the nuclei of discontent in non-Han
areas.38 Corruption, if done by Han cadres contributes to this discontent, because
minority people often perceive corruption as a misbehaviour of Han towards
minorities.
A basic conflict of Chinese society consists of the incompatibility between the
(ideologically) single-ethnic party and the polyethnic society. The party which,
corresponding to the majority of the population, is dominated by Han Chinese, is
the court of last resort. It is dedicated in its organizational structure to the
                                                 
35 Cf. Heberer 1984b.
36 See e.g. Wang Geliu 1997; He Gaowa 1997; Ma Wenyu 1997; Wu Zongjin 1998, pp. 167ff.;
Hao 1998, pp. 241ff.; Shen/Shi 1998, pp. 136ff.; Wang Yongwu 1998.
37   Op. cit. Minzu Tuanjie (Unity of Nationalities), 10/1980, p. 4.
38 See also Heberer 1987, pp. 25ff.
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levelling of all ethnic differences and is not subordinated either to the legal system
or to autonomy. Therefore all forms of self-rule find their limits here. And this
inhibits actual, implementable laws of autonomy.
Accordingly, the Autonomy Law did not in any way calm the calls of many
minority leaders for wider-ranging, actual autonomy (up to the maximum degree,
that Beijing would, following the Emperor's example, manage only the
international relations and military interests of large regions like Tibet or
Xinjiang, and leave local politics to the peoples living there). Particularly among
the larger nationalities, such as the Tibetan and the Uyghur, dissappointment
spread widely. At the beginning of the 1980s the non-Han peoples looked to
Beijing. From that quarter at the outest much was promised, but in fundamental
questions little was given. Percentage increases in the economic and educational
spheres and the re-granting of certain freedoms in the cultural sector deceive us
into ignoring the basic problem: while local ethnic cultures are valorized and
promoted in the short run, long-run objectives assume that development equals
Hanification, and policies thus become self-contradictory. Particularly among the
larger nationalities, disappointment spread widely, and younger forces radicalized,
because they no longer expected any solutions to their problems from Beijing.
1.3 Economic Sources of Conflicts
Those are primarily:
· Poverty
· Increasing development gaps
· Increasing income gaps
· Economic neglect of a nationality or its territory
· conflicts over usage of land and resources.
Minority areas remain the stepchildren of development. The gap in development
between the autonomous regions of the non-Han peoples and the Han regions has
increased in spite of the reform policies. 80% of the official number of people
under the poverty line live in minority areas.39 Particularly in terms of industrial
development the gap between Han and minorities' areas is growing (compare table
1).
                                                 
39 Weng/Zhang/Qu et al. 1995, pp. 216/217.
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Table 1: Gross Output Value of Autonomous Regions as a Percentage of
China's Total (in %)
Year                         1952    1978    1985    1990    1996    1997    1998
Ind./Agriculture  7.1 6.5 9.1 7.2 6.3 6.1 5.9
Industry  3.3 5.0 7.9 5.4 4.9 4.6 4.5
Agriculture 10.1 11.1 12.1 12.8 12.6 12.9 13.1
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1999, pp. 40/41; 382 and 423.
Only in terms of agricultural output there is a gradual increase, pointing out that a
division of labour between Han areas (industry) and non-Han areas (agriculture) is
emerging, a development pattern that Michel Hechter has characterized as a form
of a internal colonialism.40
Table 2: Per capita net income of rural households in autonomous regions
and provinces with high percentage of minorities (1985 and 1998 in
comparison)
                       Yuan               %                     Yuan               %
China 398 100.0 2,162 100.0
Guangxi 303 76.1 1,972 91.2
Inner Mong. 360 90.5 1,981 91.6
Ningxia 321 80.7 1,721 79.6
Tibet 353 88.7 1,232 57.0
Xinjiang 394 99.0 1,600 74.0
Guizhou 288 72.3 1,334 61.7
Yunnan 338 84.9 1,387 64.2
Qinghai              343               86.2              1,425              65.9
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1999, p. 339.
In all provinces (except Guangxi and Inner Mongolia in which the gap between
Han and minority areas increased either) the average per capita income of
minorities' areas has considerably decreased.
                                                 
40   Compare Hechter 1975 and 1976.
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Although, for sure, considerable materials flow from the center to the minority
areas, nearly half of the counties classified as "poor" lie in national minority areas.
Of course, the Party is not solely responsible for this, because some of these areas
are remote regions of refuge, into which non-Han peoples have had to flee from
Han expansion in recent centuries; but this also makes clear that since the
founding of the People's Republic no development policy suited to these areas has
been followed. The reform policies have visibly diminished the state tutelage. But
this has not in any way brought advantages to the minority areas. According to
Chinese reports, many autonomous areas have not been given enough credit,
subsidies, foreign exchange and materials by the center or the provinces. The
financial subsidies per head have partly been reduced. The investments in
autonomous areas (about 60% of the total Chinese territory) were 11.7% of the
total investments in 1993, 8.9% in 1994 and still less at the end of the 90s.41
Delegates from minority regions at a meeting of the National People's Congress in
the early 90s warned of the emergence of a "new fourth world" inside China, by
which they meant to point to the alarming development in many minority areas.
1.4 The Fourth Source of Conflict: Cultural conflicts
This encompasses:
·  Unequal treatment of cultures
·  Different conceptions of state and law
·  Different cultural or religious expectations and aims
The main problem of cultural policy is that since the 1950s "healthy" and
"unhealthy" customs and practices have been differentiated. Unhealthy ones
should be eliminated or "reformed"; healthy ones preserved. Because this
definition has never been precisely clarified, it always has led and continues to
lead to local interference in the area of customs.
1.5 The Fifth Source of Conflict: New Conflicts due to economic and social
change and due to breakdown of authority
Those are:
·  Modernization as an imagined threat to ethnic identity
·  Exploitation of resources
·  In-migration of Han
·  Corruption
·  Growing unemployment
·  Growing discrimination against
·  Economization of minorities' cultures
                                                 
41 Ibid., pp. 216/217.
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Exploitation of resources in minorities' areas (forests, mineral resources, land), in-
migration of Han, corruption, spatial mobilization, growing unemployment among
minority people and the growing gaps between Han and minorities in terms of
income, economic development; growing discrimination against and the
economization of minorities' cultures lead to new patterns of conflict.
Modernization processes and social change generate feelings of threat, of
disintegration, decay of minorities' cultures and social communities.
2 Patterns of Resistance
Ethnic resistance was for a long time romanticized by the Communist Party in
terms of class conflict, national liberation or revolution.42 In fact, there are
different patterns of resistance: active and passive ones, violent and peaceful ones,
formal and informal patterns. Conflicts and resistance are by no means uniform.
Each group has distinct interests and respond patterns that evoke particular forms
of ethnic opposition.
(1) Growing separatist movements
Such movements exist not only in Tibet, but particularly in Xinjiang and smaller
in scale in Inner Mongolia.43 Most crucial seems to be the development in
Xinjiang, a region inhabited primarily by Moslem and Turkic people. According
to Chinese sources there are 12 movements in Xinjiang fighting for independence,
among them radical Islamic or Pan-Turkic groups. Guerrilla warfare and violence
are widespread. In March 2000 alone more than 20 Uyghur guerilla fighters were
executed in Xinjiang.44
(2) Active local resistance
like open protests and demonstrations against the closing of temples, churches and
mosques; against the conversion of pasture land into arable land; against
deforestation, damage to the environment and ecological destruction; against
interference in customs or birth control, and against all forms of discrimination.
(3) Passive local resistance
Minority groups taking refuge in mountains or forests and the revitalization of
traditions and institutions (underground churches and mosques, Islamic
underground schools, shamans) have to be interpreted as a reaction to Chinese
perceptions of "modernization" and of growing ethnicity. The reform process did
not lead to acculturation, but primarily to a re-emergence of local traditions. The
statement of a young Yi scholar in her presentation at an international conference
three years ago is an expression of the new proud of traditions. This scholar stated
that Bimo (traditional priests, healers and exorcists) were characterized by "love
                                                 
42   See Bulag 2000, pp. 184/185.
43 Cf., for example, Hoppe 1997; Heberer 1997b; Barkmann 1997. For the Chinese leadership the
separatist movement in Xinjiang is much more dangerous than the independence movement in
Tibet, see Kaifang, July 1996, p. 39, op. cit. Becquelin 1997, p. 25.
44   Cf. Heberer 1997b. For details: Hoppe 1995.
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for their profession" and a notion of equality, as they were active for every Yi.
Bimo, she argued, are law-abiding, industrious and truth-loving, have high moral
standards and fight corruption.45 Because of this the Bimo that were outlawed for
many decades, are now once more considered to be ideal persons or, as one Yi
participant of the conference remarked, as "ideal candidates for Communist Party
membership".
(4) Revitalization of religions
This is not only true for Islam, Christianity and Tibetan Buddhism, but also for
animistic and shamanistic beliefs, for the increase of religious sects and chiliastic
movements.46 Among Miao groups the traditional expectation of salvation,
predicting that after a large desaster or catastrophe the Miao king would return,
give them back their lost land and create a Miao state, is re-emerging.47 Among
the Yi in the Liangshan mountains the influence of charismatic sect leaders who
preach that the end of the world is near is growing. As a Chinese journal has
stated, in some villages, townships and even counties such sects already control
party organizations and government institutions.48 S ch movements are occurring
in situations of rapid social change, turning to an Utopian world view as a reaction
to decay, social disintegration and the feeling of social and ethnic threat.
The increasing consciousness of national identity, especially among the larger
peoples, expresses itself, among other ways, in increasing religiousness. The
growing influence of religion and traditional culture among ethnic minorities has
to be understood as an indication of rising ethnicity. In this context, religion and
traditions are not only a reminder of one's own culture and cultural identity, but
also serve to get to grips with social change. The increasing influence of religion
and traditions are thus also a reaction to the process of social change. The process
of modernization and change weakens the cohesion of an ethnic group and
produces mobilization to preserve the group identity and in that way promotes
ethnicity.
(5) Cross-boarder Migration
(6) Migration into the prosperous coastal areas or to provincial capitals
(7) Segregation or Communalism
This means group-building in terms of ethnic categories, separation in
accomodation, space, organizations, networking, lifestyles or consumption.49
Indeed, we could identify far more patterns of resistance, like "linguistic
resistance"50, the use of minorities' languages by minority officials in reports to
higher administrative echelons (in oral or written form) or "constructive
                                                 
45 Ayi Bamo 1997 und 1998.
46 Shen Jun 1997, p. 35. See also Bajie Rihuo 1998, pp. 8/9.
47 According to informations of Miao, who asked not to be identified, in Beijing, October 1998.
For details compare Cheung 1995.
48 See, for example, Minzu 10/1995, p. 41; Zhou/Xia 1995, p. 30.
49 Ma Rong 1996, pp. 396ff.
50   See for example Bulag 2000, pp. 186ff.
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drinking"51, an excessive consumption of alcohol in order to draw borderlines
between the "we-group" and the "others". Furthermore, Han-scholars and Han-
officials claim that they were, for instance in Xinjiang or Inner Mongolia,
indigenous and that other groups migrated after the Han only52, an rgumentation
that necessarily will stir up ethnic resistance.
3 Conflict Prevention and Reduction of Conflicts
Of course, the reform policies have brought about a more liberal treatment of
minorities and have helped to improve the lives of most of them. Despite those
improvements, conflicts are growing. These conflicts cannot be solved by force or
economic improvements alone. As the cases of other ethnic conflicts on global
scale demonstrate, we need a kind of a "therapeutic conflict treatment", as the
German sociologist Dieter Senghaas has argued53, in order to reduce conflicts and
to contend with ethnic traumas. And this is a precondition for the peaceful
coexistence of nationalities in one country. Indeed, in recent years Chinese
academics have started to discuss causes of nationalities' conflicts, new types of
autonomy, safeguarding minority rights and even human rights in terms of
minorities.54 This does not mean that a basic change in Chinese nationalities'
policies will occur immediately. But moreover, as stated above, there is a kind of
affirmative action which offers advantages for members of ethnic minorities in
terms of access to universities, birth control, use of one's own languages and
scripts or cultural issues.55 Although that does not mean that minorities will be
granted democratic rights in the next few years, they are in a way accepted as
particular groups with specific rights. This and the above mentioned new
discussion on minorities' rights might provide a good starting point for more
equality and better rights in future.
What could be done then?
To ease nationalities conflicts in the long run a chance may lay in the creation of a
federative state. The question of federalism arises not only for Tibet, Taiwan or all
the provinces, but also for numerous other regions in which non-Han peoples live.
Federalism seems advisable not only for ethnic reasons, but also for spatial-
structural ones, since the central government has always had a difficult time
putting together a flexible policy adequate to the task, because of the size and
variety of the country. But if the fundamental political attitude toward the non-
Han peoples does not change, even a federal system will not be able to solve the
problems. A durable, stable federal system can only be built on the foundation of
the consent of the peoples who are to constitute it. But one should be aware of the
fact that ethnic minorities typically have substantially less affection and loyalty
for the state than the dominant ethnic majority does. In this way the interest of a
minority group in a common federal state may not be the same as the interest of
the dominant group.
                                                 
51   Williams 1998, p. 18.
52    Bulag 2000, p. 192.
53 Senghaas 1992, pp. 116ff., 1993 und 1996, p. 77.
54 Cf. Zhou Ping 1997, pp. 73/74; Chen Xiangji et al. 1996 or Liu/Fang 1997, pp. 22/23; Zhou
Ping 1997; Yang Jingchu 1998, pp. 21ff.; Wu Zongjin 1998, pp. 2ff.; Song Tao 1998;
Yue/Yuan 1998; Chen Lipeng 1998.
55 Cf. Yang Houdi 1997. An overview by Wu Shimin 1995.
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Therefore, when one thinks about concrete measures of reducing the above
mentioned five sources of conflict, then the following points should be taken into
consideration:
·  First: Establishing a federal system: Under such conditions the state would be
responsible: (a) for macro-policies (macroeconomic control, balanced foreign
trade relations, balance of regional developments and disparities, public affairs
on national level); (b) for external affairs (e. g. foreign policy and security),
and (c) regulation of social disparities and inequalities. The autonomous
regions would have the right to make far-reaching decisions on their own in all
regional or local matters (e. g. economic and cultural developments).
·  Second: More laws ensuring not only cultural, economic, and social autonomy,
but also that all decisions in regard to an autonomous region, including such
questions as immigration, the establishment of industries, control over land
and natural resources available in the territory, and environmental protection,
are made in the interest of that region and its population.
·  Third: An institutional framework for implementing autonomy rights. This
requires independent courts: legal barriers must be erected against the
majority. Also the party should not remain superordinate to autonomy, but
should be subordinate to the law. Further, care would have to be taken that not
only individuals but also ethnic groups collectively would have the possibility
to bring a case to court.
·  Fourth: Policies of affirmative action not only in the political and education
sectors but also in the economic sphere (like preferential access to capital, raw
materials and skilled labour) would be necessary to reduce inequality between
Han and non-Han.
·  Fifth: The histories and cultures of all nationalities as well as the histories of
nationalities' relations should be reassessed in a discourse of people from
the various nationalities. The concept of a hierarchization of cultures and
societies should be given up.
·  Sixth: To guarantee the above mentioned rights would require organized
representation of interests, because the right to autonomy can only be
represented or implemented by organized communities.
·  Seventh: Intensified measures are necessary to counter the growing
discrimination of members of ethnic minorities in urban areas. While open
discrimination is forbidden by law, there is much 'behind the scenes' and
everyday discrimination, and it is increasing in an alarming manner. The
existence of such a phenomenon should be acknowledged and special
programs for reducing discrimination and prejudices established.
Last but not least I argue that China may provide a good basis for such measures,
as ethnic minorities are not only recognized as nationalities, but also are respected
by public law and - according to this law - enjoy the same rights as the ethnic
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majority. Due to international developments the Party leadership has recognized
the explosive power of nationalities conflicts. A rethinking of former policies has
just begun, particularly in the academic field. Undoubtedly, in the years to come
the issue of conflict management will become a crucial point in China's
nationalities politics.
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